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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from the District Court's granting of Defendant-Respondent GEICO 
General Insurance Co.' s ("GEICO") motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b )(6), thereby dismissing a direct action by non-insured Plaintiff-Appellant 
Christina Brooksby ("Brooks by") against GEICO regarding an automobile insurance policy 
issued by GEICO to a third-party not involved in this litigation, Craig Brooksby. Brooksby 
appeals, contending that the District Court erred in dismissing her suit. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Brooksby's Complaint was filed on October 20, 2010. 1 (R. at 3-6.) GEICO thereafter 
filed its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and related memorandum on December 
15,2010. (R. at 7-16.) Following briefing by the parties and oral argument thereon held on 
February 10, 2011, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Dismiss on 
March 8, 2011, granting GEICO's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 39-45.) The District Court issued 
its Judgment on March 8, 20 II (R. at 46-47), and Brooksby subsequently filed hcr Notice of 
Appeal on April 15,2011 (R. at 48-51). 
I By way of background, Brooksby initiated suit against her father and a different GEICO-
related entity initially in an action entitled Christina Brooksby v. Government Insurance 
Employees Company and Craig Brooksby, Casco No. 09-7120 (Bonneville County) on 
December 4, 2009, as reflected in this Court's online Data Repository (available at 
https://WVvw.idcourts.us/repository/mainpublic id.do?forward=mainpublic id). Thc action 
against the other GEICO-related entity has been dismissed. 
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C. Concise Statement of the Facts2 
Brooksby's Complaint alleges that on or about December 8, 2007, she was travelling as 
a passenger in Craig Brooksby's vehicle, which was involved in a motor vehicle collision. (R. 
at 4.) Brooksby's Complaint further alleges that she was taken to the hospital and treated for 
injuries sustained in the collision. (Id.) Brooksby's Complaint further alleges that GEICO 
insured Craig Brooksby under an automobile insurance policy ("Policy"). (ld.) Brooksby's 
Complaint then asserts that she made an insurance claim against Craig Brooksby's policy for 
bodily injuries and other damages she sustained in the collision, which claim was denied. (ld.) 
Brooksby sought the following relief: 
1. That Craig Brooksby was insured by Defendant [GEICO] at the time of 
the subject collision. 
2. That Craig Brooksby had in effect liability coverage at the time of the 
subject collision. 
3. That there are no applicable exclusions under the Policy which would 
allow Defendant to deny coverage for damages PlaintifJ sustained as a 
result of the subject motor vehicle collision. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
(R. at 5.) 
Brooksby's Complaint contains no allegation that she is an insured under the GEICO 
2 Brooksby's Statement of Facts section does not clarify that the majorIty of the 'facts' 
identified - particularly as to the alleged accident and alleged claim process, cited as "R. at 4" 
and "R. at 5" are merely allegations stated in her Complaint (R. at 3-6), and have not in any 
way been established or otherwise proven in the litigation, nor did Brooksby verify the 
Complaint or submit any affidavit in support of the Complaint's allegations. 
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Policy. (R. at 3-6.) Brooksby's Complaint contains no allegation that any judgment had been 
secured by her against Mr. Brooksby. (Id.) Brooksby's Complaint further lacks any allegation 
that she had any ownership interest in the vehicle involved in the collision. (ld.) Brooksby's 
Complaint identifies no bases, whether by statute, common law, or contract, providing her 
standing to initiate suit against GEICO as an injured party. (ld.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
GEICO does not identify any additional issues on appeal. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
GEICO does not seek fees on appeal in this matter, but requests an award of costs should 
it prevail, pursuant to LA.R. 40, and/or Idaho Code § 10-1210. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Brooksby's action, as framed in her Complaint, is barred by Idaho's long-established 
prohibition on third-party direct actions by a non-insured against an insurer. This principle is 
grounded in this Court's recognition that "[t]he basis of the no-direct-action rule is that the 
person allegedly injured by the insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has no rights 
under it. 'Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured. '" 
Hartman v. United Heritage Property and Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199, 108 P.3d 340, 346 
(2005). Further, Idaho has not recognized any exception to this rule for declaratory actions by 
non-insureds, nor does the recent amendment to LR.C.P. 57 create any right of a non-insured to 
seek declaratory relief. In the present matter, Brooksby's Complaint makes no contention that 
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she has a contractual relationship with GEICO, and only seeks declaratory rulings as to what 
Craig Brooksby's contract with GEICO might require. 
Further, Brooksby's reliance on out-of-state authority is unhelpful. All of the 
jurisdictions identified provide some right to judgment creditors to initiate a direct action 
against a tortfeasor's insurer, either by way of statute or common law recognition. Idaho has no 
direct action statute, and this Court has not permitted judgment creditors to pursue direct actions 
against insurers. Hartman, 141 Idaho at 345 ("We have never held that an insured's judgment 
creditor has a direct action against the insurer. .,. We have previously held, 'A third party may 
not directly sue an insurance company in an attempt to obtain the coverage allegedly due the 
insurer's policyholder."'). In Brooksby's case, however, the Complaint fails to make any 
allegation that she is a judgment creditor, and otherwise fails to identify what statute, common 
law, or contractual provision she asserts gives her standing to seek a direct action against 
GEICO. 
Nor does public policy dictate a different result. To the contrary, Idaho has a stated 
public policy that prevents invasion of the insurer-insured contractual relationship by outsiders, 
and this Court has also indicated its reluctance to allow declaratory actions that do not serve a 
"useful purpose." Even were this Court to abandon its long-standing prohibition on direct 
actions, Brooksby's action would serve no "useful purpose," given, again, Brooksby's 
Complaint fails to make any allegation that she is a judgment creditor, and otherwise fails to 
identify what statute, common law, or contractual provision she asserts gives her standing to 
seek a direct action against GEICO even were she to hold a judgment against Craig Brooksby. 
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Finally, Brooksby's argument that the District Court erred in utilizing LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
in dismissing her suit against GEICO fails. The District Court's cited authority does, in fact, 
illustrate the necessary showing to survive a standing challenge, which showing Brooksby did 
not make. Further, the District Court did not look beyond the pleadings in reaching its decision, 
as the District Court was actually noting the lack of necessary allegations by Brooksby required 
to survive a standing challenge. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court, dismissing Brooksby's action 
against GEICO, should be affirmed. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As recently summarized by this Court: 
"[A] district court's dismissal of a complaint under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) shall be 
reviewed de novo." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 
(2010). The Court on appeal must determine "whether the non-movant has 
alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if true, would entitle him to 
relief." Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009) 
(quoting Rincover v. Dep't of Fin., 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 
(1996)). The Court must "draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party." Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P.3d 156, 160 (2005) 
(citation omitted). "After drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party, the Court then examines whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id. 
Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400,257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). Further, as this Court has 
explained: 
In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must allege all 
essential elements of the claims presented. If the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts upon which the court could grant relief, the complaint should be dismissed. 
See Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975). 
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Johnson v. Boundary School Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 334, 63 P.3d 457, 460 (2003). 
Finally, "[w]here a case has been dismissed because of a lack of standing, this Court must 
examine whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the requisite elements of standing in 
their complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253,257, 
127 P.3d 156, 160 (2005)(emphasis added). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Direct Actions Are Not Permitted in Idaho.3 
1. Idaho's bar on third-party actions, generallv. 
In Idaho, third-parties cannot sue an insurance company under an insured's insurance 
policy. '" It is well established that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing the 
action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant." 
Graham v. State Fann Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611, 67 P.3d 90,92 (2003) (quoting 
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,791, 621 P.2d 399, 407 (1980)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that a third-party cannot maintain a direct action 
against an insurer on the theory that the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary under an 
3 As noted in GEICO's arguments before the District Court (R. at 11,28), GEl CO assumes that 
Brooksby is advancing the position that Idaho law applies, as reflected by Brooksby's Idaho law 
argument in her Complaint (R. at 5, ~~15-16) and Brooksby's failure to identify other salient 
facts which might be determinative of a choice of law question particularly relating to 
interpretation of the Complaint, including the residence of Craig Brooksby and the location 
where the subject vehicle is primarily garaged. Thus, GEICO's arguments are framed under 
Idaho law, given both the procedural standing requirements under Idaho law, and the absence of 
sufficient allegations in this 12(b)(6) motion context to establish application of a different 
state's law at this time. GEICO does not waive any arguments it may have as to the applicable 
law that may ultimately apply in this action (including, but not limited to, California law), and 
does not necessarily agree that Idaho law would ultimately govern resolution of this dispute. 
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insurance policy. Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 515, 691 P.2d 375,379 
(1984). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also prevented a third-party from joining to the litigation 
the insurer of a tortfeasor for the insurer's alleged intentional delay of payment of a claim. 
Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 118 Idaho 373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990). The plaintiff in 
Hettwer was injured in an automobile accident by defendant. Id. at 373. The plaintiff attempted 
to join the defendant's insurance company as a defendant, alleging that (l) the insurance 
company insured the defendant under an automobile liability policy at the time of the accident, 
(2) the plaintiff had presented claims to the insurance company for payment under the policy, 
and (3) the insurance company had intentionally and tortiously denied or delayed payment on 
these claims. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held there was no basis for a third-party claim 
against the insurance company. Id. at 374. Not only did the Idaho Supreme Court affirm the 
dismissal of the action against the insurance company, but the Court stated, that it found the 
appeal to be "unreasonable and without foundation." Id. 
Thus, the law in Idaho as to whether a third-party may bring a cause of action against an 
insurer has been well settled - in summary, direct actions are not permitted. See, e.g., Pocatello 
Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West Inc., 101 Idaho at 791 ("It is well established that absent a 
contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued 
directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant."); Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 
at 514-15 ("Appellant should not be allowed to sue the insurance company directly any more 
than a tort victim injured in an automobile accident should be able to directly sue the insurance 
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carrier of the tortfeasor without having first proved a claim against the tortfeasor individually."); 
see also Hartman, 141 Idaho at 199 ("The basis of the no-direct-action rule is that the person 
allegedly injured by the insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has no rights under 
it. 'Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured. "')( quoting 
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92, 73 P.3d 102, 105 (2003»; Stonewall 
Surplus Lines Insurance v. Farmers Insurance, 132 Idaho 318, 971 P.2d 1142 (1998) ("A third 
party may not directly sue an insurance company in an attempt to obtain the coverage allegedly 
due the insurer's policyholder.") 
2. Brooksby's action constitutes an improper third-partv direct action. 
In this case, Brooksby has not alleged that she is directly insured by GEICO under the 
Policy. (R. at 3-6.) Indeed, her Complaint is expressly framed in the context of her making 
claim against the policy of a non-party, Craig Brooksby: 
6. An actual case and controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant 
with respect to whether the bodily injuries sustained by Christina 
Brooksby in a motor vehicle accident, which occurred in Bonneville 
County, are subject to coverage and/or coverage exclusions contained 
in Craig Brooksby's automobile insurance policy purchased from 
Defendant. 
12. At the time of the subject collision, Craig Brooksby had an automobile 
insurance policy with Defendant, which provided liability coverage, 
among other coverages. 
13. Plaintiff has made an insurance claim agasint [sic) Craig Brooksby's 
policy for the bodily injuries and other damages she sustained in the 
subject motor vehicle collision. 
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(Id at 4-5)(emphases added). Thus, Brooksby's allegations are entirely framed as third-party 
claims against GEICO, with whom she does not contend she has any policy or contract, and are 
expressly asserted as against a policy stated to be insuring someone else (Craig Brooksby). 
Further, Brooksby has failed to allege any statutory, common law, or contractual provision that 
would authorize her suit against GEICO. Accordingly, the Complaint is defective on its face as 
violative of Idaho's prohibition on third-party direct actions, and was appropriately dismissed 
by the District Court. 
3. This Court has not permitted injured parties to file declaratory actions against 
Insurers. 
Brooksby tries to avoid application of Idaho's rule barring third-party direct actions by 
bolding asserting as a section heading that "The Idaho Supreme Court Has Allowed Declaratory 
Judgment Actions by Injured Parties." (Appellant's Brief at 12.) This brash statement, 
however, is quickly tempered by the immediate acknowledgment, in the following text, that 
"the Idaho Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the issue of whether an injured party has 
standing to initiate a declaratory judgment action against a tortfeasor's insurer[.]" (Jd) 
Brooksby cites Idaho authority to suggest that such an action is permissible; however, none of 
these Idaho decisions stand for this proposition and are readily distinguishable. 
• Chancler v. American Hardware, 109 Idaho 841,712 P.2d 542 (1985) involved a 
declaratory judgment action brought by a policy-holder (Chancler) and an 
injured party (Christensen) regarding coverage for a product defect claim. This 
Court ruled upon the coverage issues, not addressing the status of Christensen as 
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an insured/non-insured under the Policy, which was apparently not raised by the 
parties. As an initial matter, the matter was appropriately ruled upon by this 
Court because an insured was, in fact, a plaintiff seeking a declaratory ruling - in 
this action, however, Craig Brooksby is not a party. Further, that a direct action 
violation is not raised is not an unknown circumstance to this Court. In Empire 
Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 716, 905 P.2d 1025 
(1995), this Court ruled upon a declaratory action filed by one insurer against 
another insurer - which would constitute a violation of Idaho's direct action rule; 
however, the violation was not addressed by this Court, having not apparently 
been raised by the parties. In a subsequent decision involving a declaratory 
action by two insurers against a third insurer, this Court rejected citation to 
Empire Fire as allowing direct actions, noting, in relevant part, that "the question 
whether a direct action by one insurance company against another was permitted 
was not decided by the Court." Stonewall Surplus Lines, 132 Idaho at 322 n.2.4 
Thus, Chancler illustrates a different factual scenario, and the issue of direct 
action was apparently not raised, thereby rendering citation to Chancler 
unhelpful. 
4 Brooksby later argues (Appellant's Brief at 13-14) that courts have a duty to raise standing sua 
sponte, and therefore, any direct action case not dismissed on standing grounds must signal 
approval of third-party direct actions. This not only disregards the potential that the issue may 
simply be simply overlooked or the record may lack sufficient information to resolve the issue, 
but it also improperly attempts to ignore this Court's oft-repeated position that direct actions are 
not permitted in Idaho. 
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• Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989) involved a 
counter-suit by a judgment creditor against an insurer to recover a portion of a 
judgment. Brooksby's reliance to this authority fails for two reasons. First, 
Brooksby has not alleged, at any time, that she is a judgment creditor. Second, 
the Court's approval of standing in Harvey was expressly made upon the fact that 
the policy at issue itself conferred standing: '''Any person or organization or the 
legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment (a judgment against 
the Insured after actual trial) ... shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this 
policy to the extent of the insurance afforded under this policy. '" Id. at 10 10. As 
Brooksby's Complaint lacks any allegation that she is a judgment creditor and 
that the Policy confers upon her standing as a result of such status (as well as 
what conditions and limitations would be placed upon such standing), Harvev 
provides no guidance in this matter, and Brooksby's Complaint is subject to 
dismissal under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
• Doron Precision Sys. v. United States Fid. & Guar Co., 131 Idaho 680, 963 P.2d 
363 (1998), withdrawn by 133 Idaho 11, 981 P.2d 246 (1999), is not authority in 
Idaho. After the initial opinion of this Court was issued, the Court subsequently 
issued its order withdrawing the Doron opinion: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the MOTION TO WITHDRAW COURT'S OPINION be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED and this Court's Opinion issued June 4, 1998 shall be 
WITHDRA WN and shall not be cited as authority." 133 Idaho at 12 (bold 
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emphasis in original, underline emphasis added). 
• Gillingham Constr. Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Constr. Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 121 P.3d 
946 (2005) is apparently cited for its brief discussion of Mutual of Enumclaw v. 
Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135,983 P.2d 208 (1990), which actually supports GEICO's 
position in this litigation. In that matter, a husband, wife, and daughter moved 
into the husband's father's home. 133 Idaho at 136. While residing there, the 
husband injured his daughter in a lawnmower accident. Jd at 137. The wife 
made claim against the husband's father's homeowner's policy. Jd The insurer 
then sought declaratory relief that there was no coverage for the accident, as all 
parties were "residents" of the "household," and, thus, were all collectively 
insureds for which claims between them were not covered under a household 
exclusion. Jd This Court held that the husband, wife, and daughter were, in 
fact, "insureds" under the terms of the policy based upon their residing at the 
husband's father's house. Jd at 139. Thus, all were appropriately parties to a 
declaratory action, as the dispute was ultimately between an insurer and 
"insureds" under the terms of the policy. Additionally, however, note that this 
Court also briefly rejected, on standing grounds, the wife and daughter's attempts 
to raise the issues of whether the insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify 
the husband or the husband's father. Jd ("Furthermore, we hold that Kate and 
Wendy have no standing to raise the issue of whether Mutual has a duty to 
indemnify or defend Jeff or John. While Jeff or John could have raised this issue, 
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neither are parties to this appeal and therefore, we need not decide the issue."). 
Thus, even where all parties were insureds under the policy, this Court still 
rejected an attempt to assert a third-party direct action - that is, a demand for 
ruling on an insurer's obligations with respect to an insured made by a party 
other than that particular insured. The Gillingham court, citing Pedersen, 
explained, in summary, that, "Pedersen merely held that a plaintiff in a personal 
injury case does not have standing to raise the issue of whether an insurance 
company has a duty to indemnify or defend its insured." Id. 5 
• Draper v. Draper, 115 Idaho 973, 722 P.2d 180 (1989) is also inapposite. 
Brooksby fails to point out that this Court in that case held as a threshold matter 
that Oregon law applied to the issue of whether a household exclusion in an 
insurance policy was valid. Draper v. Draper, 115 Idaho at 975. The Court did 
not decide Draper under Idaho law, which is the law Brooksby seeks to have 
govern this case. Furthermore, both the plaintiff and defendant in Draper had an 
ownership interest in the insured automobile involved in the accident at issue in 
Draper. Id. at 974 ("The primary issue presented is whether the household 
5 The Gillingham court went on to assert that the mother and daughter "were not named parties" 
in the Pedersen case. 142 Idaho at 20. This appears to conflict with the Pedersen decision, 
which identifies the mother and daughter as defendants, even noting that the mother had filed an 
answer and counterclaim. 133 Idaho at 135, 137. Nevertheless, the core principle stated in 
Gillingham - that "a plaintiff in a personal injury case does not have standing to raise the issue 
of whether an insurance company has a duty to indemnify or defend its insured" - still holds 
true. 
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exclusion clause contained in the insurance policy was void, allowing a wife 
(Barbara) to maintain an action against her husband (Van) up to the limits of the 
policy ... , Van and Barbara were residents of Nyssa, Oregon. State Farm insured 
a 1979 automobile (the insured vehicle) owned by Van and Barbara.") 
(emphasis added). In contrast, Brooksby has not alleged that she had any 
ownership interest in the vehicle driven by Craig Brooksby (that is, an ownership 
interest in a vehicle insured under the Policy). Further, the Draper decision is 
actually somewhat ambiguous as to the wife's status as an insured; contrary to 
Brooksby's suggestion that the wife was a non-insured, the Draper decision 
suggests otherwise: "The basis for applying the household exclusion [in State 
Farm and Casualty Co. v. Jones, 306 Or. 415, 759 P.2d 271 (1988)] was that the 
injured party was the insured. By the terms of the household exclusion, it 
excluded coverage for 'any insured' as well as 'any member of an insured's 
family residing in the insured's household.' The same is true of the household 
exclusion in this case." 115 Idaho at 978 (emphases added). Thus, Draper does 
not offer either the factual or legal support for Plaintiffs position that she urges 
it does. 
Accordingly, the authority which Brooksby claims proves that "The Idaho Supreme Court Has 
Allowed Declaratory Judgment Actions by Injured Parties" (Appellant's Brief at 12), in fact, 
does not prove anything of the sort; rather, it supports the opposite conclusion that, absent a 
statutory or contractual basis to the contrary, Idaho law prohibits direct actions by third-parties 
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against Insurance carners. Accordingly, no error lies In the District Court's dismissal of 
Brooksby's Complaint. 
4. Rule 57 does not grant an injured party a right to initiate suit against an insurer. 
Lacking Idaho authority in support of her position, Brooksby instead turns to I.R.C.P. 57 
which, having added a subsection (b) via amendment in 2008, provides that: 
(b) In an action seeking declaratory judgment as to coverage under a policy 
of insurance, any person known to any party to have a claim against the 
insured relating to the incident that is the subject of the declaratory action 
shall be joined if feasible. 
By its plain language, this rule only contemplates the joinder of a third-party claimant in an 
existing declaratory action between an insurer and insured. It does not authorize a injured party 
to initiate suit, nor does it even fully enunciate the role of the injured party following joinder. In 
the present matter, Brooksby did not enter this litigation via joinder in a declaratory suit 
between Craig Brooksby and GEICO - Craig Brooksby is not even a party to this litigation.6 
As such, this is not a case to which Rule 57 applies, as there is no action between the insurer 
and the insured. Here, Plaintiff seeks to bring a direct claim against defendant insurer, a 
procedure not contemplated or permitted by Rule 57. 
The amendment to Rule 57, adding the above subsection (b), simply reiterates this 
Court's prior ruling in Temperance Ins. Exch. v. Carver, 83 Idaho 487,365 P.2d 824 (1961), 
6 Brooksby fails to explain how Rule 57 would allow her to initiate suit against an insurer with 
which she has no contractual relationship absent involvement of the actual insured as a party 
against whom she has a personal injury claim. The record reflects that Craig Brooksby is not a 
party in this declaratory action, nor has Brooksby made any effort in this litigation to name or 
join Craig Brooksby. 
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that "[i]njured third parties are proper, but not necessary, parties defendant in an action 
brought by an insurer for a declaratory judgment determining the validity of an insurance 
policy, and its liability thereunder." 83 Idaho at 491 (emphasis added). Temperance, decided in 
1961, clearly has not provided a basis for third-party direct actions, given that this Court has 
rejected such direct actions on multiple occasions in the decades following the Temperance 
decision, including the Hartman decision, which not only held that the lack of inclusion of the 
injured parties did not render a declaratory judgment between an insurer and insured void, but 
also reiterated the general rule that direct actions were prohibited, even such that judgment 
creditors themselves could not seek direct actions against insurers. Hartman, 141 Idaho at 345 
("We have never held that an insured's judgment creditor has a direct action against the insurer. 
... We have previously held, 'A third party may not directly sue an insurance company in an 
attempt to obtain the coverage allegedly due the insurer's policyholder. "'). 
Thus, neither Rule 57, nor the related principle stated in Temperance, authorize an 
injured party to bring a third-party direct action against an insurer, and, as such, Brooksby's 
argument on this argument fails. The decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
B. Out-of-State Decisional Authority Provides No Grounds to Vitiate Idaho Law. 
Apparently recognizing that Idaho law provides no basis for her suit, Brooksby instead 
predicates much of her appellate argument via citation to legal treatises and out-of-state 
decisional authority, even before discussion ofIdaho law regarding direct actions. (Appellant's 
Brief at 3-12.) Brooksby also relied heavily on non-Idaho sources in opposing the motion to 
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dismiss, a strategy appropriately rejected by the District Court: "Furthermore, [Brooksby] has 
not supported her argument with any authority that is binding upon this Court." (R. at 44.) 
It is axiomatic that, in Idaho, judicial "decisions from sister states are not controlling," 
and that this Court is bound to "apply to the case under consideration that line of decisions 
which ... [are] consonant with [Idaho law] ... , regardless of any numerical weight of 
authority." Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 367, 386 P.2d 374, 391 (1963). 
That is to say, it very well may be that other states permit direct actions, or permit declaratory 
actions by injured parties prior to judgment in the underlying tort actions; however, Idaho has 
no such authority, such that reference to non-binding out-of-state decisions and legal treatises, 
regardless of the volume of citation, is unnecessary and not useful. 
Nevertheless, Brooksby's lengthy discussion of out-of-state law overlooks a key 
common point found in the cases, which is not at issue in this litigation: the cases all involve 
some recognized right (whether by statute or at common law) of a judgment creditor to initiate a 
direct action against an insurer, which some courts (outside of Idaho) will view as thereby 
creating an adequate legal interest to allow an injured party to seek declaratory relief directly 
against an insurer. 7 A relatively cursory review of Brooksby' s cases illustrates this point: 
7 That some jurisdictions allow declaratory actions by injured parties against insurers based 
upon a judgment-creditor direct action right, even before a final judgment against an insured 
tortfeasor is secure, is still not indicative of a universal rule. For example, Nevada allows 
judgment creditors to proceed directly against insurers following judgment. Hall v. Enterprise 
Leasing Company-West, 137 P.3d 1104, 1109 (Nev. 2006). By the same token, however, 
Nevada law does not permit pre-judgment declaratory actions, as an injured party's rights do not 
mature until an actual judgment is secured against the insured. Vignola v. Gilman, 2011 WL 
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• Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Legeyt, 25 Mass. L. Rep. 262, 2008 WL 5784218 
(Mass. Super. 2008) is a lower court decision from Massachusetts involving, in 
part, a counterclaim by a defendant named by an insurer in a declaratory 
judgment action. Brooksby's lengthy quotation from Dorchester ignores the 
court's preceding remarks: 
Although Massachusetts appellate courts do not appear to have addressed 
the issue of an injured party's standing to seek a declaratory judgment 
against a tortfeasor's insurer, the Supreme Judicial Court has stated that 
an injured party's interest in the policy of another originates with the 
accident. Fallon v. Mains, 302 Mass. 166, 168, 19 N.E.2d 68 (1939). 
In Fallon, the Court stated that the "plaintiffs right to have recourse to 
the policy came into existence upon the occurrence of the 
accident.. .. " Id. See Goldstein v. Bernstein, 315 Mass. 329, 332, 52 
N.E.2d 559 (1943) ("Upon the happening of the accident, ... the plaintiffs 
acquired a beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy and the right, if 
judgments were entered in their favor in the tort actions, to enforce in 
their own names the satisfaction of their judgments out of the indemnity 
furnished to the insured by the company"). 
2008 WL 5784218, at *5. Idaho has no such legal principle enshrined in its 
caselaw, nor does it have any variety of "reach and apply" statute such as 
1399840, at *4 (D. Nev. 2011) ("In contrast, under Nevada law, declaratory relief between a 
third party claimant and an insurer is proper only after the third party obtains a tort judgment 
against the tortfeasor. The rights of a tort claimant against a tortfeasor's insurer do not mature 
until the tort claimant obtains a judgment against the tortfeasor. Thus, a plaintiff has 'no legally 
protectable interest' in an action for declaratory relief until she establishes liability of the tort 
defendant. Prior to obtaining a tort judgment against the tortfeasor, a plaintiffs rights against 
the tortfeasor's insurer are speculative and not ripe for declaratory relief.")(internal citations 
omitted). 
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Massachusetts' ,8 which is also referenced in the Dorchester opinion. Mass. Gen. 
L. 175 §1139 (cited at 2008 WL 5784218, at *5, n.8.) 
• Christian v. Sizemore, 383 S.E.2d 810 (W.V. 1989) involved a personal injury 
plaintiff attempting to amend her personal injury complaint to add a declaratory 
action against the alleged tortfeasor's insurer. While the West Virginia Supreme 
Court permitted such, the basis for the Court's ruling in that case was based on 
extant West Virginia law: "This Court has recognized that an injured plaintiff 
who has obtained a judgment against a defendant vehicle owner or operator is 
entitled to maintain a declaratory judgment action against the defendant's 
insurance carrier to impose liability under the policy." Id at 812. For that 
reason, "there is an actual controversy between the insurance carrier and the 
injured plaintiff because of the very real possibility that the plaintiff will look to 
the insurer for payment." Id at 814. This is because, in West Virginia, it is 
"established law that if an insured with coverage under a liability insurance 
policy does not pay the underlying judgment entered in a personal injury action, 
8 Massachusetts' "reach and apply" right is simply a direct action right; that is, a right to 
proceed directly against an insurer to recover a judgment amount secured against an insured 
tortfeasor. See, e.g., Rogan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 25 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1940). 
9 "Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person by any person, including executors 
or administrators, for any loss or damage specified in the preceding section, if the judgment 
debtor was at the accrual of the cause of action insured against liability therefor, the judgment 
creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money applied to the satisfaction of the judgment 
as provided in the ninth clause of section three of chapter two hundred and fourteen." Mass. 
Gen. L. 175 § 113. 
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the injured plaintiff may institute a direct action against the insurance company 
to recover the amount of the judgment up to the limits of the policy." Broy v. 
Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 233 S.E.2d 131, 132 (W.Va. 1977). 
• Maryland Cas. Co. v. Nestle, 2010 WL 3735756 (S.D. Miss. 2010) involved, in 
part, an argument by an injured party that an insurer was equitably estopped from 
denying a duty to defend and indemnify regarding a suit between the injured 
party and the insured. In noting that "[i]n a declaratory judgment action, an 
injured party has standing to establish coverage under a tortfeasor's insurance 
policy," however, the court referred to two earlier decisions: Johnson v. Great 
Am. Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp.2d 657 (S.D. Miss. 2001) and Titan Indem. Co. v. 
Williams, 743 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). In Johnson, the court 
noted that Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57, amended in 2000, specifically 
authorized direct actions. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 661, nA.1O Titan, which preceded 
the M.R.C.P. 57 amendment in 2000, simply noted that "Mississippi's long-
standing prohibition against litigating a claim against an alleged tortfeasor's 
liability insurer without first obtaining a judgment against the insured has been 
limited in the interest of judicial economy[.]" 743 So. 2d at 1023. The Titan 
holding simply recognized that such actions earlier in litigation would be 
10 Indeed, M.R.C.P. 57(b)(2) expressly provides: "(2) A contract may be construed either before 
or after there has been a breach thereof. Where an insurer has denied or indicated that it may 
deny that a contract covers a party's claim against an insured, that party may seek a declaratory 
judgment construing the contract to cover the claim." 
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permitted, as Mississippi already authorized judgment creditors to directly seek 
recovery from insurers. See, e.g., Coleman v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 
708 So.2d 6 (1998) (garnishment action by judgment creditor against insurer); 
Leader Nat. Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 477 So.2d 1323 (Miss. 1985)(same). 
• Sagamore Ins. v. Deming, 2008 WL 4071195 (Conn. Super. 2008) is a lower 
court decision from Connecticut regarding a summary judgment motion made by 
a defendant-injured party named by an insurer in a declaratory action regarding a 
pending personal injury action. There, the court's discussion of "persons with 
direct interests" (*6) made little discussion of what said "interests" were. A 
review of Connecticut law, however, demonstrates that Connecticut's limitation 
on direct actions is itself limited, as Connecticut not only allows direct actions 
where questions of the insured's negligence are not implicated, see, e.g., 
Alexander v. W.F. Shuck Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 2783587 (Conn. Super. 
2009) ("Thus, because the medical payments provision is a 'distinct and separate 
provision' ... that does not implicate the insured's negligence, the policy 
concerns embodied under Connecticut law are inapplicable, and the plaintiff can 
bring a direct action against the insurer."), but also has a statute specifically 
authorizing direct actions by a judgment creditor against an insurer. Conn. Gen. 
Stat. §38a-321." 
II "Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person, firm or corporation by any 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 21 
• Dial Corp. v. Marine Office of Am. Corp., 743 N.E. 2d 621 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001) 
involved a declaratory action brought by an insured during the pendency of an 
underlying personal injury action. However, Illinois permits direct actions by 
judgment creditors against insurers, even requiring insurers to advise Illinois 
insureds of such. Ill. Compo Stat. 215 5/388; 12 accord Skidmore V. Throgmorton, 
751 N.E.2d 637,640 (Ill. App. 2001) (discussing statute and related authority). 
• Monroe V. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 603 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1992), another Illinois decision, involved an effort by a decedent's estate to 
reform an underinsured motorist policy, regarding a claim for damages wherein 
the decedent was a passenger in the vehicle operated by the insured at the time of 
person, including administrators or executors, for loss or damage on account of bodily injury or 
death or damage to property, if the defendant in such action was insured against such loss or 
damage at the time when the right of action arose and if such jUdgment is not satisfied within 
thirty days after the date when it was rendered, such judgment creditor shall be subrogated to all 
the rights of the defendant and shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent 
that the defendant in such action could have enforced his claim against such insurer had such 
defendant paid such judgment." 
12 "No policy of insurance against liability or indemnity for loss or damage to any person other 
than the insured, or to the property of any person other than the insured, for which any insured 
is liable, shall be issued or delivered in this State after July 1, 1937, by any company subject to 
this Article unless it contains in substance a provision that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the 
insured shall not release the company from the payment of damages for injuries sustained or 
death resulting therefrom, or loss occasioned during the term of such policy, and stating that in 
case a certified copy of a judgment against the insured is returned unsatisfied in any action 
brought by the injured person or his or her personal representative in case death results from the 
accident because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, then an action may be maintained by the 
injured person or his or her personal representative against such company under the terms of 
the policy and subject to all of the conditions thereof for the amount of the judgment in such 
action not exceeding the amount of the policy." (emphasis added). 
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the accident. In addition to the legal backdrop of Illinois' allowance of direct 
actions by judgment creditors, the court in Monroe also made the express finding 
that "plaintiffs decedent, because she was 'occupying' the Gibbons' automobile, 
was an insured under the Gibbons policy now in question." 603 N.E.2d at 858. 
• Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1992) related 
to, in summary, an underlying negligence suit by an injured party against an 
insured regarding an estimate of oil and gas reserves. The injured party filed suit 
against the insured, then sought declaratory relief against the insurer. Id. at 679-
80. In distinguishing between a tort-based 'direct action,' and a declaratory 
action, the court applied Illinois law. Of course, as already discussed above, 
Illinois allows direct actions by judgment creditors. 13 
• Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stockdale, 50 F. Supp. 2d 871 (N.D. Iowa 1999), as 
Brooksby expressly recognizes, is made in the shadow of Iowa's direct action 
statute, Iowa Code §516.1. 14 It is this statute, affording a judgment creditor a 
direct action, that creates the legally cognizable interest allowing an injured party 
13 Brooksby also cites Reagor (Appellant's Brief at 11), but, again, Illinois law allows direct 
actions by judgment creditors. 
14 "All policies insuring the legal liability of the insured, issued in this state by any company, 
association or reciprocal exchange shall, notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes, 
contain a provision providing that, in event an execution on a judgment against the insured be 
returned unsatisfied in an action by a person who is injured or whose property is damaged, the 
judgment creditor shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent that such 
insured could have enforced the insured's claim against such insurer had such insured paid such 
judgment." Iowa Code §516.1. 
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to bring a declaratory action, per Iowa decisions cited by the Utica court. See 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 572 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 1997)("Iowa's 
direct action statute gives an injured party, such as the estate, a cause of action 
against the insurer if the injured party obtains a judgment that he cannot collect 
by execution against the insured. Consequently, the estate has an interest in 
McCarthy's insurance coverage. Because this interest is "of sufficient immediacy 
and reality to warrant declaratory [relief,]" ... the estate has standing to pursue 
this appeal.")(internal citations omitted); Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Coover, 225 
N. W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1975)("The general rule is that the injured person's 
interest in the liability insurance policy of the insured arising at the time of the 
injury under this kind of direct action statute is sufficient to make a coverage 
dispute between the insurer and insured a justiciable controversy between the 
insurer and the injured person. "). 
• Berrios v. Jevic Transp., Inc. 15 is a lower-court Rhode Island decision involving 
a wrongful death action, where the estate of the injured party sought to amend 
the complaint against the insured to also assert a claim for declaratory relief 
against the insured's insurer. Again, however, the court noted that Rhode Island 
15 Berrios is a Superior Court decision not presently available on Westlaw or in the Rhode 
Island caselaw library on Casemaker. It is, however, available at the Rhode Island Superior 
Court website, at http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SuperiorCourtlDecisionsOrders/decisionslO4-
2390.pdf (retrieved October 6, 2011). Citations are made to the page number notations on the 
. pdf copy of the decision. 
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permits a judgment creditor to assert a direct action against an insurer: "Section 
27-7-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws states in relevant part: 'every policy 
written insuring against liability for. . . personal injuries. . . shall contain 
provisions to the effect that the insurer shall be directly liable to the injured 
party. . . to pay that party the amount of damages for which the insured is 
liable.' ... Section 27-7-2 states in part: 'an injured party ... , in his or her suit 
against the insured, shall not join the insurer as a defendant. .. The injured party . 
. . after having obtained judgment against the insured alone, may proceed on that 
judgment in a separate action against the insurer. '" Jd. at p. 4-5. In light of this, 
'" the victim of an insured's tort ... has a legally protectable interest in that policy 
before he has reduced his tort claim to judgment.' This injury was sufficient to 
confer standing upon the injured party to bring a declaratory-judgment action 
against the insurer." Jd. at p. 5 (quoting Mendez v. Brites, 849 A.2d 329 (R.I. 
2004)). 
• Miller v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co., 157 Fed. Appx. 632 (4th Cir. 2005) is an 
unpublished decision from the Fourth Circuit regarding an appeal from the 
Western District of Virginia, wherein an injured party's estate sought a 
declaratory action against a homeowner's insurer. Notably, the quote offered by 
Brooksby is actually dicta within a footnote, as the issue of standing was actually 
resolved as a question of federal law, rather than Virginia state law. Jd. at 637 
("Whether Miller has standing to maintain this declaratory judgment action is a 
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question that must be resolved under well-established principles of federal 
law."). 16 Turning to Virginia law, then, the other Virginia authority cited by 
Brooksby Martirosov v. Shenandoah Flight Services, Inc., 2003 WL 23312786 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2003) - which related to a personal injury action by a decedent's 
estate against an insured, again notes that Virginia also has a statute that allows 
for post-judgment direct actions against insurers. Id. at *4 (discussing Va. Code 
§38.2-2200 17 and Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice (2d) § 142.1 18). 
16 The Fourth Circuit found standing under federal law, based upon the fact that the injured 
party's estate had secured a verdict: "When Miller commenced this action, the district court in 
her wrongful death case had already entered against Mitch a default judgment on liability. Thus, 
while there was at the time of filing a question about the extent of damages that would be 
awarded, there was no doubt that some amount of damages would be awarded. The certainty of 
a damage award against one of Augusta Mutual's insureds thus makes the coverage question 
definite and concrete." 157 Fed. Appx. at 637. 
17 "No policy or contract insuring or indemnifying against liability for injury to or the death of 
any person, liability for injury to or destruction of property, or liability for injury to the 
economic interests of any person, shall be issued or delivered in the Commonwealth unless it 
contains in substance the following provisions or other provisions that are at least equally 
favorable to the insured and to judgment creditors: 1. That the insolvency or bankruptcy of the 
insured, or the insolvency of the insured's estate, shall not relieve the insurer of any of its 
obligations under the policy or contract. 2. That if execution on a judgment against the insured 
or his personal representative is returned unsatisfied in an action brought to recover damages for 
injury sustained or for loss or damage incurred during the life of the policy or contract, then an 
action may be maintained against the insurer under the terms of the policy or contract for the 
amount of the judgment not exceeding the amount of the applicable limit of coverage under the 
policy or contract." Va. Code §38.2-2200. 
18 As quoted by the Martirosov court: ""The injured party generally has standing to bring a 
direct action against the insurer for a declaratory judgment concerning coverage, even though 
the liability action against the insured has not been liquidated in any way. The injured party's 
interest in the coverage issue is legally sufficient to support standing to seek a declaratory 
judgment, even though there is no judgment against the insured because of the injured party's 
right, under either the case law of the state or the state's direct action statute, to sue the 
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The same is true of the legal treatises cited by Brooksby, which, read more completely, do not 
support Brooksby: 
• 22A Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 138 (cited in Appellant's Brief at 3) 
notes that declaratory actions are "inappropriate where the issues presented by 
the coverage question cannot be adequately resolved before the underlying case 
is resolved, or where the court feels that resolution of the underlying case might 
obviate the need for the judgment sought." Further, § 134 of this Am. Jur. even 
specifically notes, as a prerequisite for a justiciable controversy between an 
injured party and an insurer, that there be a direct action statute: "An injured 
person's interest in the liability policy of the insured, arising at the time of the 
injury, under a direct action statute giving an injured person who obtains a 
judgment the right to proceed against the insurer if his or her execution 
against the judgment debtor is returned unsatisfied, is sufficient to make a 
coverage dispute between the insurer and insured a justiciable controversy 
between the insurer and the injured person." (Id.)( emphasis added). Idaho has 
no such direct action statute. 
• Couch §232:67, cited by Brooksby, also cautions: "However, since a court asked 
to render a declaratory judgment on whether an insured's conduct is covered 
under a liability policy must not determine disputed issues of fact which form the 
insurer directly after obtaining a judgment against the insured." 2003 WL 23312786, at *4 
(emphasis added). 
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basis for the insured's liability in the underlying tort action, the existence of a 
bona fide controversy over whether an insured's conduct alleged in an underlying 
tort case is negligent or intentional renders premature a declaratory judgment 
action to determine liability coverage until the controversy is resolved in the 
underlying case." (Id.) Given the lack of a judgment against Craig Brooksby, 
the lack of a right of a judgment creditor in Idaho to seek a direct action against 
an insurer, and a lack of a litigated dispute between GEICO and Craig Brooksby, 
it would be premature for the District Court to rule as to Craig Brooksby's 
potential liability (and, in turn, GEICO's duty to indemnify any damages that 
Brooksby would be legally be entitled to recover from Craig Brooksby) - thus, 
declaratory relief by Brooksby would be inappropriate. Note, additionally, that 
Couch §242: 1 correctly includes an Observation that "[n]ot all jurisdictions 
allow for direct actions by a third party against the insurer." As has been 
established, Idaho is among those jurisdictions that does not. 
• Insurance Claims and Disputes §8:8 is also more caveated than indicated by 
Brooksby. Windt specifically notes: 
The issue, however, is far from resolved. Arguments can be and have 
been made that the injured party's interest in the policy proceeds is too 
contingent to sustain an action by the injured party against the insurer and 
that, although the injured party can be joined in an action brought by the 
insurer, joinder in that case is necessary to avoid a multiplicity of 
litigation, a consideration not present when the injured party seeks to sue 
the insurer. Moreover, the Reagor decision is premised on the court's 
holding that the injured party was a third-party beneficiary of the 
insurance contract. This is not true in all jurisdictions, and where it is 
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not, the better rule would probably be to hold that there is no 
justiciable controversy between the injured party and the insurer 
prior to the time the injured party obtains a judgment against the 
insured. 
(Id.)(emphasis added). Note, too, that Windt's characterization of the law in 
§8:8 ("Of course, once the injured party has a judgment against the insured, the 
injured party does have standing to sue.") and, later, in §9: 11 ("In all states, 
however, an injured party who has once obtained a judgment against the insured 
can then sue the carrier for the amount owed under the policy.") is wholly 
incorrect as regards Idaho, as this Court has clearly stated the law in this 
jurisdiction to be exactly the opposite. Hartman, 141 Idaho at 345 ("We have 
never held that an insured's judgment creditor has a direct action against 
the insurer. ")( emphasis added). 
Thus, Brooksby's cited authority contemplates both legal and factual predicates that do not exist 
in this matter or within the law of this state. 
Therefore, to reiterate, it is indisputable that Idaho affords judgment creditors no right to 
seek a direct action against an insurer. There is no statute affording such a right, and this Court 
has never indicated that Idaho's common law provides such a right. Hartman, 141 Idaho at 345 
("We have never held that an insured's judgment creditor has a direct action against the insurer. 
... We have previously held, 'A third party may not directly sue an insurance company in an 
attempt to obtain the coverage allegedly due the insurer's policyholder. "'). In the present 
matter, Brooksby has alleged no right as against GEICO that would, in turn, create a legally 
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cognizable interest to seek a declaratory action regarding Craig Brooksby's insurance policy. 
Further, even were one to assume, arguendo, that Brooksby did have some direct action right 
against GEICO based upon a judgment creditor status, Brooksby has not alleged that she is 
presently a judgment creditor. 
Thus, not only is Brooksby's out-of-state authority directly contrary to established Idaho 
law, but is also inapplicable, given that the legal and factual prerequisites set forth in that 
authority does not mirror the instant litigation. Even were Brooksby to eventually identify some 
out-of-state, lower court, unpublished decision that allowed an injured party to seek declaratory 
relief against a tortfeasor's insurer in the absence of a direct action right, such a discovery 
would not warrant reversal of long-standing, existing Idaho law. As such, the District Court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
C. Public Policy Also Provides No Basis for Brooksby's Action. 
Brooksby next turns to a public policy argument in support of her contention that her 
declaratory action should not have been dismissed. (Appellant's Brief at 15-17.) In support of 
such argument, Brooksby again relies upon caselaw addressing Illinois law (addressed above), 
Mississippi law (addressed above), and West Virginia law (addressed above), all of which 
recognize the right of a judgment creditor to institute a direct action against an insurer following 
a judgment, thereby allowing declaratory actions prior to judgment in certain circumstances. 
Brooksby also cites to a treatise regarding New York law; however, New York's highest court 
has more recently addressed the issue, and, taking a more stringent approach like Nevada, noted 
that its direct action statute only created a right to declaratory relief after judgment: 
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Insurance Law § 3420 grants an injured plaintiff the right to sue a tortfeasor's 
insurance company to satisfy a judgment obtained against the tortfeasor. The 
issue presented in this appeal is whether the injured party may bring a 
declaratory judgment action against the insurance company before securing a 
judgment against the tortfeasor. We hold that a judgment is a statutory condition 
precedent to a direct suit against the tortfeasor's insurer. 
While the personal injury case was pending, plaintiff also initiated this 
declaratory judgment action against Hanover challenging the disclaimer of 
coverage. Plaintiff sought a declaration that Bachman was an insured under the 
Durbin policy and that Hanover was therefore obligated to compensate Lang for 
the injuries Bachman negligently caused. Hanover answered and moved to 
dismiss the complaint. Among other arguments, Hanover asserted that plaintiff 
lacked standing to sue Hanover directly because plaintiff had not yet obtained a 
judgment against Bachman, Hanover's purported insured. 
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not obtain a .judgment against 
Bachman, the alleged tortfeasor. Having failed to fulfill the condition 
precedent to suit, plaintiff could not pursue a direct action against Hanover 
and the Appellate Division properly granted Hanover's motion to dismiss 
the complaint. 
Lang v. Hanover Ins. Co., 820 N.E.2d 855, 856 & 858 (N.Y. 2004)(emphasis added). 19 
In addition to incorrectly emphasizing public policy statements of jurisdictions with 
different direct action legal schemes, Brooksby's argument overlooks this Court's previous 
emphasis on the sanctity of the insurance contract between the insurer and the insured, which 
demonstrates the public policy against allowing a stranger to the contract to attempt to dictate 
contractual relations through an action on that contract against one of the contracting parties: 
We have never held that an insured's judgment creditor has a direct action against 
the insurer. In support of their argument that we have implicitly approved such 
19 Note, further, that Lang does not draw an artificial distinction between a "declaratory 
judgment action" and a "direct action," simply holding that an improper declaratory action 
violated New York's bar on pre-judgment direct actions. 
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actions, the Hartmans cite language from Downing v. Travelers Insurance Co., 
107 Idaho 511, 514-15, 691 P.2d 375 378-79 (1984), wherein we stated, 
"Appellant should not be allowed to sue the insurance company directly any 
more than a tort victim injured in an automobile accident should be able to 
directly sue the insurance carrier of the tortfeasor without having first proved a 
claim against the tortfeasor individually." (Emphasis added.) According to the 
Hartmans, the emphasized language indicates that once the injured party has 
proved a claim against the tortfeasor individually, the injured party can then sue 
the tortfeasor's insurance carrier directly. The Hartmans read that portion of the 
Downing opinion too broadly, and overlook our clarification of it in Graham v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 138 Idaho 611,67 P.3d 90 (2003). 
In Graham, the plaintiff had obtained a judgment for $2,100 against the insured 
in small claims court, and the insurance company appealed. At the trial de novo 
on appeal, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the insured for $2,602.50. He 
then filed an action against the insurance company alleging that by appealing the 
small claims judgment, it breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing owing to 
a judgment creditor of its insured. When arguing that we should recognize such 
cause of action, he relied upon the same portion of the Downing opinion as do 
the Hartmans here. We rejected the argument and explained that the plaintiff in 
Graham was reading too much into that portion of the Downing opinion. 
In context, this statement does not establish Graham's position. The 
controversy in the Downing case was one of a "direct action of an 
employer against an insurer, by a party not a party to the insurance 
contract," and it did not concern a third-party with a judgment. The point 
on which the court disposed of the case was the fact that the plaintiff had 
attempted to bring an action "without first establishing entitlement to any 
death benefits under the collective bargaining agreement, appellant is 
attempting to circumvent the requirement that she establish a right under 
the death benefit provision of the collective bargaining agreement." 
Downing was decided prior to White v. Unigard ( Mutual Insurance, 112 
Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986)] and cannot be read to establish the right 
of a third party to bring an action for the breach of good faith and fair 
dealing against the tortfeasor's insurance company. In Idaho there is no 
such right. 
138 Idaho at 614, 67 P.3d at 93 (internal citations omitted). 
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Hartman, 141 Idaho at 198-99. The Idaho Supreme Court further emphasized and explained 
this point, recognizing the well-established policy of this state to preserve the sanctity of the 
contract between an insurer and its insured: 
Any rights against United Heritage that the Hartmans may acquire as judgment 
creditors of Keane cannot be greater than the rights that Keane would herself 
have against United Heritage. If the Hartmans executed upon Keane's claims 
against United Heritage, they could only obtain whatever claims she had on the 
day the execution was levied. I.e. § 11-309. Their status as judgment creditors of 
Keane does not make them additional insureds under the insurance contract. 
Even if we were to grant them the right to seek recovery directly from United 
Heritage, rather than by executing upon whatever claims Keane may have, their 
right to recover against United Heritage would be no greater than Keane's right 
to recover. 
We have previously held, "A third party may not directly sue an insurance 
company in an attempt to obtain the coverage allegedly due the insurer's 
policyholder." Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 
132 Idaho 318, 322,971 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1998). While recognizing the no-
direct-action rule, the Hartmans ask us to hold that the insurance company and its 
insured are prevented from resolving between themselves the issue of coverage 
under the policy, at least until the third party has litigated its claim against the 
insured. The basis of the no-direct-action rule is that the person allegedly 
injured by the insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has no 
rights under it. "Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer 
and the insured." Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92, 73 
P.3d 102, 105 (2003). We decline to adopt a rule preventing the parties to that 
contract from resolving disputes that may arise between them regarding the terms 
of their contract. 
Hartman, 141 Idaho at 199 (emphasis added). 
This public policy concern is even more amplified in this scenario, where there is neither 
a judgment nor a right to seek a direct action even with a judgment. This Court has previously 
expressed its discomfort with declaratory actions that do not serve a "useful purpose" or which 
involve facts more appropriately determined in the underlying proceeding rather than in the 
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declaratory action. Ennis v. Casey, 72 Idaho 181, 185-86,238 P.2d 435, 438 (1951 )("An action 
for a declaratory judgment may be maintained only for the purpose of determining and 
declaring fixed legal rights where it will accomplish some useful purpose. It cannot be invoked 
merely to try issues and determine questions which are uncertain and hypothetical."); Country 
Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 961, 975, 695 P.2d 346, 360 (1984) 
("[T]here would be a strong inclination to direct a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to try, as dispositive of the question of policy coverage, factual issues 
of negligence and proximate cause. Under consideration of good judicial administration, we 
highly question the propriety of trying such issues in advance of those same issues being tried in 
the underlying action, wherein the judgment will be dispositive and not moot."). 
For these reasons, no public policy ground favors reversing the District Court's decision 
to dismiss Brooksby's action against GEICO, and that decision should be affirmed. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing Brooksby's Action Pursuant to 
1.R.c.P. 12(b). 
Finally, Brooksby contends that the District Court erred in dismissing the Complaint 
under LR.C.P. 12(b )(6), and erred in citing to Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. 
Andrus, 127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995) ("SPBA I") and Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. 
State ex reI. Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 919 P.2d 1032 (1996) ("SPBA II"). Brooksby's arguments on 
these points are incorrect. 
The District Court's discussion of SPBA I and SPBA II, and its dismissal of the 
Complaint per I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), was squarely framed by this Court's statement that: "It is well 
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established that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action, an insurance 
carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant." Graham, 138 Idaho 
at 613 (quoted by the District Court at R. at 42). Thus, in opposing GEICO's motion to dismiss, 
Brooksby had to identify some contractual or statutory provision authorizing her direct action 
against GEICO. 
As noted above, the Complaint is devoid of any contention that Brooksby had a contract 
with GEICO or was otherwise insured under the GEICO policy, and instead only asserts that the 
Policy was Craig Brooksby's. (R. at 4, ~6 and at 5, ~12.) Recognizing this problem during the 
motion to dismiss phase, Brooksby made no alternative allegation, and instead retreated to the 
language of Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, §1O-1202, arguing that it provided standing. (R. 
at 23.) 
The Court's discussion ofSPBA I and SPBA II was in the context of what Brooksby had 
to demonstrate to prove that she had standing to pursue a direct action against GEICO. Both 
SPBA I and SPBA II make clear that the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is not, itself, a 
substitute for standing. 127 Idaho at 245 ("While the Declaratory Judgment Act may potentially 
expand the scope of remedies available to the environmental groups if they are ultimately 
successful, it does not relieve them of the obligation to demonstrate that they have standing to 
bring the action in the first instance."); 128 Idaho at 834 ("As SPBA acknowledges, the 
Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the 
action in the first instance."); R. at 42-44 (discussing same). Thus, a plaintiff must still 
demonstrate that they are an "interested" party under Idaho Code § 10-1202 on some other basis 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 35 
of standing, and this Court has made clear that, for an action against an insurer, there must be "a 
contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action." Graham, 138 Idaho at 613.20 
Brooksby has identified none, and, in the context of an LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion, did not aver 
any such valid contractual or statutory provision in her Complaint. (R. at 3-6.) Brooksby's 
attempts to distinguish SPBA I and SPBA II on the grounds that such decisions implicated 
different kinds of relief and were in different procedural contexts does not impact the District 
Court's correct evaluation of those cases for the principle that the Declaratory Judgment Act 
does not itself confer standing to a party that otherwise lacks standing. 
Further, Brooksby appears to intimate that the Court looked beyond the scope of the 
pleadings in ruling upon GEICO's motion to dismiss, arguing that "[t]he relevant insurance 
contract was not placed before the court and it is a factual determination as to whether any 
provision in the policy or any circumstances surrounding the automobile collision 'authorize the 
action. '" (Appellants' Brief at 19.) Brooksby's argument disregards the fact that the onus is 
upon her to make an allegation in her Complaint that there is a contractual or statutory provision 
authorizing the action. Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho at 257 ("Where a case has been dismissed 
because of a lack of standing, this Court must examine whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
alleged the requisite elements of standing in their complaint to survive a 12(b )(6) motion to 
dismiss.")(emphasis added). No such allegation is contained in Brooksby's Complaint, which, 
20 Again, that Idaho Code § 10-1202 itself does not provide standing for a direct action against 
an insurer is borne out by the simple fact that it became law in 1933, and has not been amended 
since. In the subsequent decades, however, this Court has outlined and reiterated that direct 
actions are not permitted in Idaho. 
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again, only asserts that the Policy was Craig Brooksby's. (R. at 4, ~6 and at 5, ~12.) Brooksby 
did not attach the Policy to her Complaint. Brooksby did not submit an affidavit during the 
motion to dismiss briefing stage to present such evidence to the Court. Brooksby's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss specifically asserts she is seeking relief against a policy not held 
by her. (R. at 25: "Christina Brooksby has standing, as an injured party, to bring a declaratory 
action against GEICO to seek determination regarding whether there is liability insurance 
coverage in a claim she is making against GEICO's insured."). Brooksby's brief-in-chief on 
this appeal specifically notes that "Christina made a claim against her father's insurance 
carrier." (Appellant's Brief at 1.) In arguing to the District Court on the motion to dismiss, 
Brooksby made no contention that the Policy made her an insured in some fashion or authorized 
her action. (Tr. at 11. 12:23-16: 1.) In fact, the District Court was not referencing any evidence 
outside of the pleadings, but instead was simply illustrating the lack of allegations by Brooksby 
that would otherwise be needed to survive a standing challenge: 
This Court concludes that Christina cannot maintain this action against GEICO 
without manifesting a 'contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action.' 
See Graham, 138 Idaho at 613, 67 P.3d at 92. Christina has never asserted that 
a contractual relationship exists between her and GEICO. Christina has never 
asserted that any provision of the contract between GEICO and her father gives 
her authorization to sue GIECO [sic]. Christina has not cited any statutory 
provision that gives her authority to sue on the contract between her father and 
GEICO. 
(R. at 44)(emphases added). 
Thus, Brooksby's belated attempt to now suggest that the Policy may offer some 
authorization for her action should be disregarded, given that Brooksby - at no time in her 
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Complaint or in arguing before the District Court - made any such suggestion. Given the lack 
of any such allegation in her Complaint, Brooksby has failed to properly allege standing (per 
Taylor v. Maile, supra), such that the District Court's dismissal of her Complaint pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) was entirely appropriate and not in error. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the March 8, 2011 decision of the District Court dismissing 
Brooksby's Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 26th day of October, 2011. 
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